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The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of
Disputes
Sue Ann Motat
I. Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on
January 1, 1995, by the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 As of September 1999, the Geneva
based WTO had more than 130 members Over three-fourths of
those members are developing or least-developed nations. ' Those
nations receive special status, and, in addition to other benefits,
Sue Mota, Professor, Department of Legal Studies and International Business,
Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, Order of
the Coif, M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State University. Sara Graziano, BGSU
student, is acknowledged for her research assistance on this project.
I See Final Act Embodying the Results of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. The Uruguay Round was
the eighth round of GATT. The first round, GATT 1947, was entered into by twenty-
three contracting states in Geneva to reduce customs tariffs and other impediments to
trade. The first five rounds: the Geneva Round in 1947; the Annecy, France Round in
1949; the Torquay, England Round in 1950-51; the Geneva Round in 1955-56; and the
Dillon Round in Geneva in 1961-62 focused on tariff reductions. In addition to tariff
reductions, the Kennedy Round in Geneva in 1964-67 produced an Anti-dumping Code.
The Tokyo Round in 1973-79 cut tariffs and created codes to regulate non-tariff matters
such as customs violations, subsidies and countervailing measures, antidumping,
standard import licensing, and government procurement. The eighth round, the Uruguay
Round, 1986-94, was signed in Marrakesh, Morocco in April 1994. See AN ANATOMY
OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 3 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulus ed., Kluwer Law
International 1997).
2 See WTO, About the WTO-History (visited Sept. 3, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/inbrief/inbrOl.htm>. There are roughly thirty countries
currently negotiating for membership. See WTO, About the WTO-Organization
(visited Sept. 3, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/inbrief/inbr02.htm>.
3 See WTO, About the WTO-Developing Countries (visited Sept. 8, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/inbrief/inbr04.htm>. The European Union, the United States,
and other industrialized members, however, have the greatest share of international trade.
See WTO, About the WTO-Statistics A (visited Sept. 8, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/statis/de.htm>.
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they receive technical assistance and training, and are allowed
more time to implement agreements as a result of that status.4
The WTO administers the WTO trade agreement; acts as a
forum for ongoing multilateral trade negotiations;6 serves as a
tribunal for resolving disputes;7 reviews the trade policies and
practices of members;8 and cooperates with other international
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank to standardize global economic policy making.9 The
WTO is "the only international organization dealing with global
rules of trade between nations,"' and since the total volume of
world trade in 1997 was fourteen times what it was in 1950," the
WTO is becoming an increasingly important organization.
The establishment of the WTO was guided in part by the
procedures, customary practices, and decisions of the former
GATT organization." The GATT organization was a loose
confederation of states, which contracted to promote the free trade
in goods internationally. 3  The WTO replaced the GATT
organization, but in doing so adopted the GATT agreement
regarding the trade of goods as one of its bases.' 4 The WTO,
unlike its predecessor, also governs international trade for services
and intellectual property, and provides a comparatively efficient
framework for resolving trade disputes and enforcing dispute
resolution decisions. 5 The WTO is comprised of members rather
" See WTO, About the WTO-Developing Countries, supra note 3.
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. Ii,
para. 1, Legal INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
6 See id. art. III, para. 2.
7 See id. art. III, para. 3.
8 See id. art. III, para. 4.
9 See id. art. III, para. 5.
10 WTO, About the WTO-History (visited Sept. 3, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/inbrief/inbrOI.htm>.
" See WTO, About the WTO-Statistics B (visited Sept. 8, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/statis/be.htm>.
12 See WTO Agreement art. III, para. 1.
13 See WTO, About the WTO-Facts (visited Sept. 8, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/about/facts6.htm>.
" See id.
15 See id.
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than loose contracting parties.'6 In essence, the WTO swallowed
and then increased the scope of the GATT organization.
The dispute resolution process under the WTO is particularly
innovative, compared to prior processes, and contributes more to
global economic stability than does any other aspect of the WTO.'
7
This article will begin by describing the WTO's dispute resolution
process. 18 It will then present a statistical overview of the disputes
that have been brought before the WTO, '9 and discuss many of
those cases and the extent to which they were resolved. 20 The
article will conclude with some recommendations for improving
the dispute resolution process."
II. WTO's Dispute Resolution Process
"The dispute settlement system of the [WTO] is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system."22  The prompt settlement of disputes is essential
to the effective functioning of the WTO. 3 The dispute resolution
process seeks to produce positive, mutually acceptable solutions to
problems .24
The WTO Agreement established a Dispute Resolution Body
(DRB) charged with creating panels, adopting panel and appellate
body reports, and monitoring compliance with rulings and
recommendations.25 A dispute resolution begins when a WTO
16 See id.
17 See AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 1, at 23.
18 See infra notes 22-47.
19 See infra notes 48-64.
20 See infra notes 65-235.
21 See infra notes 235-43.
22 WTO Agreement Annex 2, art. 3, para. 2.
23 See id. Annex 2, art. 3, para. 3.
24 See id. Annex 2, art. 3, para. 7. A proper balance between the rights and
obligations of members is important. See id. Annex 2, art. 3, para. 3. Members should
exercise judgment concerning whether an action would be fruitful before bringing a case.
See id. Annex 2, art. 3, para. 7.
25 See id. Annex 2, art. 2, para. 1; see generally Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO
Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999); Padideh Ala', Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An
Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade
Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1129 (1999); John Gaffney, The Review of the
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 25
member requests a consultation with the DRB and other relevant
committees.2 Any other involved member(s) must enter into the
consultation in good faith.27 These consultations are confidential.28
If a dispute is not resolved within sixty days after a request for
consultation, the member bringing a complaint may submit a
written request for a panel.2 9  The parties may voluntarily
undertake other good offices, conciliation, or mediation, which
may continue even while a panel proceeds. 0
The panel examines the matter before the DRB in light of the
relevant provisions of the agreement in question, and produces
findings to assist DRB in making recommendations. The three
member panels are comprised of experienced governmental and/or
non-governmental individuals from diverse backgrounds, who are
selected to ensure independence.3 2  If a dispute is between a
developed country and a developing country, the developing
country may request that the panel include at least one panelist
WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate,
14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1223 (1999); Kim Vander Borght, The Review of the WTO
Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate, 14 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 1223 (1999); Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute
Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195 (1998); John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1997).
26 See WTO Agreement Annex 2, art. 4, para. 4. Note that the agreement also
provides for expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an additional means for resolving
disputes. Id. art. 25, para. 1.
27 See id. Annex 2, art. 4, para. 3.
28 See id. Annex 2, art. 4, para. 6.
29 See id. Annex 2, art. 4, para. 7. In urgent cases, such as disputes involving
perishable goods, the panel may be requested within twenty days. See id. Annex 2, art. 4,
para. 9. The member requesting the panel must identify the specific measures at issue
and the legal basis for the complaint so as to present the problem clearly. See id. art. 6,
para. 2.
30 See id. Annex 2, art. 5, paras. 1, 5.
31 See id. art. 7, para. 1. Agreements covered include the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization and Multilateral Trade Agreements such as Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods, the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(hereinafter GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPS). See id. app. 1.
32 See id. art. 8, paras. 1, 2. Citizens of members involved in the dispute may not
serve on a panel involved in the dispute unless the parties to the dispute agree. See id.
art. 8, para. 1.
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from another developing country.33 If more than one member
requests a panel on a matter, a single panel will be established by
such means as will not impair the rights of any of the disputing
parties.34
A panel may seek information and technical advice from
appropriate bodies after informing the members involved. 35 Panel
deliberations are confidential.36 Panels issue interim reports to the
parties. Parties may request that panels review sections of interim
reports and/or hold further meetings with the parties on identified
issues.37  Unless a party wishes to appeal the panel
recommendation, a final report is submitted to the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) for approval. 38 Only parties to disputes
may appeal,3 9 and appeals are heard only on legal issues.
The seven-member appellate body hears appeals from panel
cases in three-person groups. 4' As with panel proceedings,
appellate body proceedings are confidential. 42  No ex parte
communications with panels or the Appellate Body are allowed.43
33 See id. art. 8, para. 10.
14 See id. art. 9, paras. 1, 2. Third party members with substantial interests in
disputes shall also have the opportunity to be heard. See id. art. 10, para. 2.
" See id. art. 13, para. 1.
36 See id. art. 14, para. 1. The panels meet in closed session and deliberations and
documents are kept confidential. See id. app. 3, para. 2.
31 See id. art. 15, para. 2.
38 See id. art. 15, para. 4. A proposed timetable for this process follows: Five to
nine weeks after the first written submission of the parties, the panel has the first
substantive meeting with the parties. One to two weeks later, written rebuttals are
received. A second meeting is held two to three weeks later, then two to four weeks later
a preliminary report is issued to the parties, who have about two weeks to comment. The
interim report is issued, and the parties may request to review this. There may be an
additional meeting with the parties. Two weeks after that, the final report is issued to the
parties, and then the final report is circulated to the members. See id. app. 3.
" See id. art. 16, para. 4.
40 See id. art. 16, para. 6.
41 See id. art. 16, para. 1. These seven members are "persons of recognized
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade, and the subject matter
of the . . . agreement" in question. The seven are to be "broadly representative of
membership in the WTO, unaffiliated with any government," and free from conflicts of
interest. Id. art. 16, para. 3.
42 See id. art. 16, para 3.
43 See id. art. 18, para. 1.
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The Appellate Body may "uphold, modify, or reverse the legal
findings and conclusions" of a panel. 44 The DRB adopts or rejects
the appellate body's decision.45
The Agreement establishing the WTO states that prompt
compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is
"essential to ensure effective resolution of disputes. 46  If an
offending party fails to implement a ruling, the WTO may request
voluntary compensation from, and/or temporarily suspend
concessions that benefit that party.4
III. Disputes Taken to the WTO
A. Statistical Overview
At the time of this writing, WTO members had requested 175
consultations regarding 134 distinct matters. 48  Developed
countries requested 131 consultations regarding 101 distinct
matters; developing countries made thirty-four requests regarding
thirty distinct matters.49  Ten requests were made by both
developed and developing countries on four distinct matters.5 ° The
respondents to complaints brought by developed countries were
seventy-five developed country members and fifty-six developing
country members.5 ' The respondents to complaints brought by
developing country members were twenty-two developed
countries and twelve developing countries. 2 All respondents to
requests made by both developed and developing countries were
developed countries. 3 In summary, 61% of the respondents were
developed countries, and 39% of the respondents were developing
countries.
4 Id. art. 17, para. 13.
45 See id. art. 17, para. 14.
46 Id. art. 21, para. 1.
47 See id. art. 22, para. 1.
48 See WTO, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (visited Sept. 21,
1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/buIletin.htm> [hereinafter Disputes Website].
49 See id. summary.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id.
" See id.
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Twenty-six complaints have been decided, and of those,
developed countries brought sixteen, and developing countries
brought nine.14 The remaining case was brought by a combination
of developed and developing countries.55  Thus, developed
countries brought 61.5% of the completed cases, developing
countries brought 37.7 %, and one case was brought by a
56
combination of developing and developed countries. Of the
sixteen complaints brought by developed countries, nine (56.3%)
were against other developed countries,57 with the remaining seven
(43.8%) brought against developing countries. Developed
countries won 81.3% of the cases they brought overall and 100%
of their cases against developing countries.58  Of the nine
complaints brought by developing countries, two (22.2%) were
against other developing countries.59  The remaining seven
(77.8%) were against developed countries. 60 Developing countries
won 100% of their cases against developed countries, and 88.9%
of all the cases they brought.6'
Complainants won twenty-one of the twenty-six completed
cases brought, or 80.8% of such cases.62 Of the four times a
complainant lost, the United States lost three times, and the
Philippines lost once. 63 Both pending and completed cases are
summarized below, and the case summaries are grouped according
to how far through the dispute resolution process each case has
progressed. 64
B. Consultations & Panels Pending
As of this writing, seventy consultations are pending.65 The
14 See id.
55 Seeid.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id.
I See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See id.
I See infra notes 65-235 and accompanying text.
65 See Disputes Website, supra note 48.
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United States filed a number of requests for consultation with the
DRB in May and June of 1999. In May, the United States alleged
that Indian measures affecting trade and investment in the motor
vehicle sector were inappropriate.66 That same month the United
States filed complaints against the European Community (France
67in particular) and against Argentina. Respectively, the
complaints against France and Argentina alleged violative
preferential domestic treatment in the form of aircraft industry
subsidies, and inadequate pharmaceutical product patent
protection coupled with the lack of an effective exclusive
marketing system for such products in violation of the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). 6 In June 1999, the United States complained that the
European Community was not adequately protecting U.S.
trademarks, and was allowing geographical labeling on
agricultural products and foodstuffs in violation of TRIPS. 69 The
United States has an additional consultation pending against
Canada over Canada's patent term.7°
In March 1999, Canada filed a complaint against the United
States over a countervailing duty investigation involving live cattle
from Canada.7' India has a consultation involving South Africa
over anti-dumping duties of certain pharmaceutical products from
India. 72  A Czech Republic complaint alleges that Hungary's
quantitative restrictions on a broad range of steel products from
the Czech Republic violate GATT. 73  Hungary contends that a
Czech Republic's import duty on wheat from Hungary also
violates GATT.74
Brazil filed a complaint against the European Community
contesting measures affecting the differential and favorable
66 See id. § VII, para. 60.
67 See id. § VII, paras. 57, 58(a).
68 See id.
69 See id. § VII, para. 59.
70 See id. § VI, para. 23.
71 See id. § VII, para. 55.
72 See id. § VII, para. 57.
73 See id. § VII, para. 54.
14 See id. § VII, para. 46.
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treatment of coffee.75 Canada filed a complaint against the
European Community over patent protection for pharmaceutical
and agricultural products under TRIPS.76  Mexico, whose case
against Guatemala was dismissed in January 1999, has
resubmitted its complaint regarding Guatemalan anti-dumping
measures on gray Portland Cement from Mexico.77
The European Community has complained about Argentine
anti-dumping measures on imports of drill bits from Italy, and
about Argentine measures relating to the export of bovine hides
and the import of finished leather.78 The European Community
filed complaints against India for a series of increases in customs
duties and import measures.79 The European Community has also
filed a complaint in response to U.S. rules of origin for textiles and
apparel products.8°
As of this writing, twenty-one panels were active.8" The
European Community and Japan have complained about certain
Canadian measures, which allow only limited numbers of car
manufacturers to import vehicles into Canada duty-free, under an
Auto Pact between the United States and Canada. 2 In January
1999, following a June 1998 request for consultation, the
European Community requested a panel review of U.S. imposition
of countervailing duties on certain hot-rolled lead and bismuth
carbon steel products originating in the United Kingdom.83 In
February 1999, a panel was convened to review a U.S. complaint
alleging improper imported beef restrictions by Korea.4
A panel was established in February 1999 to examine
European Community allegations that the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act
of 1916 is still in effect, and is applicable to the import and
75 See id. § VII, para. 51.
76 See id. § VII, para. 50.
77 See id. § VIII(A), para. 15.
78 See id. § VII, para. 52; see also id. § VI, para. 18
79 See id. § VII, para. 48.
80 See id. § VII, para. 49.
81 See id. § VI.
82 See id. § VI, paras. 9(a), 10(b).
83 See id. § VI, para. 11.
4 See id. § VI, para. 13(a).
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internal sale of any foreign product irrespective of its origin.85 The
European Community alleges that this act violates GATT.86
The European Community and the Japanese contend that a
Massachusetts act that regulates state contracts with companies
doing business with Burma (Myanmar) violates GATT.87 The
European Community also has questioned the validity of several
sections of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which grant special
tax treatment to Foreign Sales Corporations.88 The United States
has challenged a Mexican anti-dumping investigation of high-
fructose corn syrup from the United States.8 9 In May 1999, the
European Community sought review of the U.S. imposition of
100% duties on certain products from the European Community.9°
As of this writing, all four of these challenges were before panels.
A number of panel reviews were requested in June 1999.
First, the United States requested a panel to review Argentine
measures affecting the importation of U.S. footwear." That same
month the United States requested that another panel examine
allegedly improper government procurement practices in Korea.92
In addition, in June 1999, Japan requested a panel, charging that in
a number of cases involving affiliates of Japanese companies, U.S.
courts had failed to apply procedural safeguards mandated by the
Anti-Dumping Act. 93 Finally, the European Community requested
a panel on U.S. definitive safeguard measures in the form of
quantitative limits on imports of wheat gluten from the European
94Community.
C. WTO Complaints Resulting in Panel, Appellate Body, and
Arbitrator's Reports
Five cases resulted in the issuance of a panel report, an
81 See id. § VI, para. 8.
86 See id.
87 See id. § VI, para. 3(a).
88 See id. § VI, para. 2.
89 See id. § VI, para. 5.
90 See id. § VI, para. 15.
1 See id. § VI, para. 21.
92 See id. § VI, para. 17.
93 See id. § VI, para. 19.
9" See id. § VI, para. 20.
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appellate body report, and an arbitrator's report.95  Developed
countries brought three of these cases against other developed
countries. 96 One case involved developed countries bringing suit
against a developing country. 97 The fifth case was brought by both
developing and developed countries against a developed country.9"
The complainants won 100% of the cases that they brought.99
These cases are summarized in the subsequent paragraphs.'°°
Prior to January 1999, the European Community and the
United States complained about Korea's taxes on alcoholic
beverages.' °' Under the Korean tax guidelines, imported alcohol
was taxed differently than domestic alcohol, and the complaining
parties alleged that this was intended to protect domestic alcohol
producers in violation of GATT.02 A panel and the appellate body
upheld the joint complaint, and the DSB approved the reports in
February 1999. In June 1999, an arbitrator gave Korea eleven
months and two weeks to implement the ruling.' 3
In another case, Canada requested that a panel review
Australia's prohibition on the importation of fresh, chilled, or
frozen salmon from Canada, under Australia's Quarantine
Proclamation. '04 The panel found that Australia had violated the
9' See WTO, Panel and Appellate Body Reports (visited Sept. 30, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See id.
lO See infra notes 101-55 and accompanying text.
101 See WTO Appellate Body Report on Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14 (Jan. 18, 1999). Korea's Liquor Tax Law imposes an ad
valorem tax on distilled spirits; the rate of tax differs for each of the eleven categories of
alcoholic beverages. See id. para 2. The appellate body agreed with the panel, and
recommended that the DSB request that Korea bring its laws into conformity with
GATT. See id. paras. 169-70.
102 See id. para. 2.
103 See WTO Award of the Arbitrator Claus-Dieter Ehlermann on Korea-Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages, Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes WT/DS75/16, WT/DS/84/14 para.
48 (June 4, 1999).
"4 WTO Appellate Body Report on Australia--Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon WT/DS 18/AB/R 32 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter ABR Australia]. Under this act,
passed in December of 1996, Australia's Director of Quarantine decided that uncooked,
19991
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Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
Measures (SPS) of GATT 1994.1°5 The violation occurred because
Australia had maintained a sanitary measure not based on a risk
assessment, adopted arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the
levels of sanitary measures that it considered appropriate in
different situations, and maintained a sanitary measure more trade-
restrictive than necessary.' 6  The appellate body reversed the
panel's reasoning with respect to some sections of the SPS
Agreement, but nonetheless found that Australia had acted
inconsistently with other sections of the agreement, and
recommended that the DSB request that Australia conform.""
Canada requested arbitration, and the arbitrator gave Australia
eight months to comply.' 8 The eight-month compliance period
expired on July 6, 1999.'09
In a third case, two panels, each composed of the same three
persons, heard U.S. and Canadian complaints about the European
Community's prohibition on imports of meat and meat products
derived from cattle to which either the natural hormones
oestradiol-17B, progesterone or testosterone, or the synthetic
hormones trenbolone acetate, zeranol or melengestrol acetate
("MGA"), had been administered." 0 The European Community
banned the importation of U.S. beef in 1989 because these growth
wild, adult, ocean-caught Pacific salmon should not be imported into Australia.
Quarantine Proclamation No. 86A, Australian Government Gazette, No. S33, Feb. 21,
1975.
lOS See ABR Australia, supra note 104.
1o See id. at 218. The panel requested that the DSB ask Australia to bring its
measures into conformity with the agreement. See id.
107 See id. at 123-24.
118 See WTO, Award of Arbitrator Said El-Naggar on Australia--Measures
Affecting Importation of Salmon, Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS18/9 (Feb. 23,
1999).
109 See id.
"1o WTO, Appellate Body Report on E.C.-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter
ABR EC Meat]; see generally Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the
"World Trans-science Organization": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy and Fact-
finding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 251 (1998); Layla
Hughes, Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels: The WTO Appellate
Body Beef Hormone Decision, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 915 (1998).
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hormones were administered to U.S. cattle."' The panels issued
similar reports concluding that the European Community, by
maintaining sanitary measures not based on a risk assessment, and
by adopting arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of
sanitary protection in different situations, violated sections of the
SPS Agreement."'
On appeal, the European Community alleged, among other
things, that the panel allocated the burden of proof incorrectly and
used an inappropriate standard of review under the SPS
Agreement."3 The appellate body reversed the panel's ruling on
the burden of proof, but affirmed its ruling on the standard of
review. While the complaining party bears the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular
provision of the SPS Agreement, the appellate body found that the
panel's general interpretative ruling, that the member imposing an
SPS measure has the evidentiary burden, was bereft of basis in the
SPS Agreement, and reversed that ruling.14 The SPS Agreement
is silent as to standard of review, but the appellate body concluded
that the panel applied the appropriate standard.' The panel must
make an objective assessment of the facts under Article 11 of the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Agreement, and the panel complied
with this obligation. 16 The appellate body left intact those panel
conclusions that were not appealed, and recommended that the
European Community bring the measures concerning meat
hormones into conformity." 7 The DSB adopted the reports."8
The European Community informed the DSB that it intended
to comply, and the parties held discussions to set a reasonable time
period for compliance. The parties, however, could not reach an
"' See ABR EC Meat, supra note 110.
112 See id. para. 6.
113 See id. para. 96.
"1 See id. para. 102.
"1 See id. para. 253(b).
116 See id. para. 253(e).
117 See id. paras. 254, 255. The Appellate Body upheld most of the findings and
conclusions of the panels, but reversed on a few findings and conclusions, and modified
the panel's interpretation of sections of the SPS Agreement. See id. para. 253.
118 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 9.
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agreement.'" 9  Thereafter, an arbitrator determined that fifteen
months was a reasonable time period in which to comply. 120 In
April 1999, one month prior to the expiration of the compliance
period, the European Community informed the DSB that it would
consider offering compensation if it could not comply by the
deadline. 2' In June 1999, the United States and Canada requested
authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions to the
European Community valued at U.S. $202 million and Can. $75
million. 22  The European Community requested arbitration on
these monetary valuations and the DSB referred the issue to the
original panel for arbitration.'23 Arbitrators fixed amounts at U.S.
$116.8 million and Can. $11.3 million per year.124
The best known WTO dispute, the so-called "Banana Wars,"
tested the strength of the WTO as a dispute resolution
mechanism. 25  Prior to 1973, the European Community, the
second largest banana market in the world, maintained a free
market in bananas. However, in 1973 the European Community
developed a banana preference regime with former European
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP
countries). 26  The trade preference was implemented under the
1975 Lom6 Convention,'2 7 which approved a package of European
119 See WTO Award of Arbitrator on E.C.-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by Canada, Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26, WT/DS48 paras. 1, 2
(July 12, 1999) [hereinafter AARB EC Meat].
120 See id. para. 48.
121 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I.
122 See AARB EC Meat, supra note 119, para. 1.
123 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 9.
124 See AARB EC Meat, supra note 119, paras. 15, 17.
125 WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities--Regime for
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997)
[hereinafter ABR Bananas]. Following a panel decision, there was a dispute between the
complainants and the respondent over whether the respondent had complied with the
panel recommendations. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
126 See id. The ACP countries account for 19% of European Community banana
imports. See id.
"' See id. paras. 96, 100. The E.C. was granted a waiver to certain obligations
under GATT 1947 with respect to the Lom6 Convention. See id. para. 14. This Lom6
waiver is in effect until February, 2000. See id. The ACP countries are Belize,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Madagascar,
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Community aid programs to seventy-one ACP countries, thirty-
nine of which are among the world's forty-eight poorest nations.
2 8
The United States, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico
requested consultation in September 1995. Ecuador, the producer
of 32% of the world's bananas in 1997 and the leading Latin
American supplier of bananas to the European Community,
129
requested consultation on the same issue in February 1996, after
Ecuador joined the WTO. 3" A panel was formed, and issued four
reports. The reports held that the European Community's regime
for the import of bananas, and its licensing procedure were
inconsistent with GATT, the General Agreement of Trade in
Services (GATS), and the import licensing agreement. 3' The
reports advised the DSB to request that the European Community
conform its banana import regime.
3 2
The European Community appealed the panel recommendation
on several grounds. First, the European Community claimed that
the United States did not have standing to bring its claim under
GATT 1994 because, although the United States grows bananas in
Puerto Rico and Hawaii for internal consumption, the United
States is not a banana exporter.'33 The European Community
based its appeal on the proposition that, under any system of law,
including international law, a claimant must have a legal right or
Somalia, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname. See WTO
Subsequent Panel Report on European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R tbl. 1 (April 12, 1999) [hereinafter SPR
bananas]. The first 857,700 tons of bananas from these countries are duty-free. See id.
Over this amount, non-traditional ACP bananas are also given a preferential structure.
See id.
128 Raj Bhala, Preference for Its Former Colonies, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at
S36. There was an overall tariff-rate quota of 851,000 tons of bananas at reduced or zero
tariff. See id. Latin American bananas were excluded, but four banana-exporting Latin
American countries, Columbia, Costa Rico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, negotiated a
separate Banana Framework Agreement (BFA) with the European Community. See id.
The European Community also has a complex licensing system whereby the firms
holding the licenses are authorized to import bananas. See id. The World Bank views
this as inefficient; the European licensees profit more than the ACP countries. See id.
129 See id. Ecuador's share of world exports of bananas grew from 23% in 1990 to
32% in 1997. See SPR Bananas, supra note 127, Annex 2, tbl. 1.
13o See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § VII, para. 7.
131 See ABR Bananas, supra note 125.
132 See id. para. 2.
13' See id. paras. 14-15.
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interest in a claim. 34 The panel and appellate body disagreed on
the grounds that no provision of the WTO Agreement contains an
explicit provision that members have a legal interest as a
prerequisite for requesting a panel.'35
The European Community raised several additional issues on
appeal, but the appellate body agreed with the panel's conclusion
that the European Community could not violate GATT 1994.136
Under the Lomd Convention, the European Community is required
to grant duty-free access to some ACP bananas.'37 The panel and
appellate body agreed that the import licensing agreement is
subject to both GATT 1994 and GATS.'38
The DSB adopted the panel and appellate body reports in
September 1997.' An arbitrator decided that a reasonable period
of time for the European Community to implement the
recommendations and rulings would expire on January 1, 1999.140
The European Community revised its measures and informed the
DSB that the new system would be fully operational as of that
134 See id. para. 15. The European Community referred to judgments of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice. The
appellate body, however, did not read these cases to stand for such a general principal.
See id. para. 133.
'I See id. para. 132. A member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a
case against another member. See id. para. 135. Since the U.S. produces bananas, the
internal market could be affected, and there is a potential export market, the U.S. has
standing. See id. para. 136. U.S. corporations account for 70% of Latin America's
banana exports to the European Community. See Bhala, supra note 128, at S36.
136 See ABR Bananas, supra note 125, para. 158. The GATT rule on non-
discriminating administration of quantitative/restrictions and tariff quotas prohibits
allocation of tariff quota shares to some but not all members. See id. para. 152.
'37 The 4 h ACP-BBC Convention of Lomd, Declaration of the Contracting Parties,
Dec. 9, 1994, L/7604. Duty-free access for 90,000 tons of non-traditional ACP bananas,
a margin of tariff for 100 ECU/tons for all other non-traditional ACP bananas, and tariff
quota shares in the amount of their pre-1991 best ever export values are required. See
ABR Bananas, supra note 125, para. 255(g).
I38 See ABR Bananas, supra note 125, para. 22. The panel finding that GATS
claims made by Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras were not within the scope of this case
was reversed. See id. para. 175.
"I See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 7.
141 See WTO Arbitrator Decision on European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB para. 20 (Jan. 7, 1998)
[hereinafter ARB Bananas].
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date.' 41 On January 14, 1999, however, the United States claimed
that the European Community had failed to implement the panel
ruling, and requested the suspension of concessions to the
European Community in the amount of U.S. $520 million. 142 The
European Community requested arbitration and the DSB referred
the issue to the original panel for arbitration. 143  The arbitrator's
report calculated that the level of impairment suffered by the
United States was U.S. $191.7 million per year.' 4 On April 9,
1999, the United States requested that the DSB authorize
suspension of concessions in that amount, and on April 19, 1999,
the DSB so authorized.1
45
The final case for which a panel report, an appellate body
report, and an arbitrator's report were issued was brought by the
United States, the European Community, and Canada against
Japan. 146 The complainants challenged Japan's liquor tax law. 141
The panel concluded that Japanese Shochu and imported vodka,
whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and liquors were similar, or at
least directly substitutable products, 14' and that taxing the imports
in excess of the domestic product violated GATT. 14  The panel
advised the DSB to request that Japan bring its liquor tax law into
conformity with GATT 1994."5°
"' See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 7.
142 See id.
141 See id.
'44 See id.
145 See WTO Dispute Settlement Board Report European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/DSB para. 20 (Apr. 9,
1999).
146 See WTO Panel Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8,
WT/DS 10, WT/DS I1 para. 7.2 (July 11, 1996) [hereinafter PR Alcohol].
147 Shurzdiho Law No. 6 (1953) (Japan).
141 See PR Alcohol, supra note 146, para. 7.1. The first sentence of GATT 1994,
Article 111:2 establishes that taxing imported products in excess of like domestic
products, is inconsistent with Article III. See id.
14 See id. The second sentence of GATT 1994, Art. 111:2 contains a general
prohibition against the imposition of internal taxes or other internal charges to imported
products, where substantially similar or directly competitive domestic products are not so
taxed, where the purpose is to protect domestic production. Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
1"o See PR Alcohol, supra note 146, para. 7.2.
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Pursuant to an appeal by Japan, the appellate body concluded
that the panel erred in law on some issues, 5' but nevertheless
recommended that the DSB ask Japan to bring its liquor tax law
into conformity with GATT 1994. The appellate body agreed with
the panel that Shochu and the imported alcoholic beverages were
like products, that Japan had taxed the imported products at higher
rates than the domestic products, and that Shochu and most other
distilled spirits are directly competitive or substitutable products.' 2
The DSB accepted the panel and appellate body reports in
November 1996.' An arbitrator found that a reasonable period
for implementation was fifteen months. 5 4  Japan presented
modalities for implementation that were accepted by the
complainants.'55
D. Complaints Resulting in Panel and Appellate Body Reports
At the time of this writing, eleven cases have resulted in panel
and appellate body reports. 5 6  Of those eleven, developed
'5' See WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes in Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DSIo/AB/R, WT/DS1l/AB/R para. I(b) (Oct. 4, 1996). The panel
erred in law by failing to take into account Article 111.1 in interpreting Article 111:2. See
id. In so concluding, the appellate body looked at the WTO Agreement as an
international contract. See id. para. F. In exchange for the benefits derived as a WTO
member, the countries agree to the commitments so made. See id. Under Article 31, a
treaty is interpreted in good faith according to the ordinary meaning of the terms of the
treaty, taken in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. See id. Doing
so, the panel erred in the conclusion alone. See id. para. D. The panel's conclusion
regarding directly competitive or substitute products were erroneous as a matter of law,
and the panel report failed to address the full range of alcoholic beverages. If imported
and domestic products are not "like products" for the purpose of Article 111:2., first
sentence, then they may still be "directly competitive or substitutable products" under
Article 111:2, second sentence. The panel was correct to look at physical characteristics,
common end uses as shown by elasticity of substitution, and tariff classification to make
this determination. See id. para. H(2)(a).
152 See Ramon Q. Gupta, Appellate Body Interpretation of the WTO Agreement: A
Critique in Light of Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
683 (1997).
"I See WTO Award of Aritrator on Japan-Taxes and Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/ARB, WT/DSIo/ARB, WT/DSI I/ARB para. 1 (Feb. 14, 1997).
' See id. para. 27.
151 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 2.
156 See id. § I, summary.
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countries brought three cases against developing countries.'57 One
was brought by a developing country against a developing
country. Developed countries brought two cases against a
developing country.'58 Five were brought by developing countries
against developed countries. 9 Developing countries won their
cases against developed countries in 100% of the cases.16
Developed countries also won their cases against developing
countries in 100% of the cases." ' Overall, complainants won
81.8% of the cases.1
6 2
The United States complained that Japanese prohibitions on
agricultural products imports, via quarantine restrictions, violated
GATT.'63 The panel determined that the Japanese measures did
violate GATT.' 64 The appellate body upheld the finding that
Japan's varietal testing of apples, cherries, nectarines, and walnuts
was without scientific basis.16  The DSB adopted the reports in
March 1999.166 Japan is studying ways to implement the
recommendations.
In a complaint brought by the European Community against
India, over the alleged absence of patent protection for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, the panel
found that India had not complied with TRIPS; the panel report
subsequently was adopted.' 67 A similar complaint was brought by
the United States; panel and appellate body reports in favor of the
complainant were adopted by the DSB. 161 In April 1999, India
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, WT/DS76/ABIR para. 2 (Feb. 22, 1999).
'64 See id.
165 See id. The United States alleged violations of Articles 2, 5, and 8 of the SPS
Agreement, Article XI of GATT 1994, and Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
See id.
166 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § VIII, para. 18.
167 See WTO Panel Report on India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R p. 79 (Aug. 24, 1998).
168 See WTO Appellate Body Report on India-Patent Protection for
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reported that legislation had been enacted in accordance with both
reports.169
When an appellate body ruled against the United States in a
dispute over a U.S. prohibition on the importation of certain
shrimp and shrimp products, it opened the door to allow for the
consideration of amicus briefs from non-state parties. 7 °  That
panel heard arguments by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand,
and concluded that the U.S. ban was not consistent with GATT
1994.' On appeal, the United States claimed that the panel erred
by not accepting non-requested submissions from non-
governmental organizations.'72 The appellate body agreed with the
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
The United States claimed violations of sections 23, 65, and 70 of the TRIPS Agreement.
The appellate body in the U.S. case stated that members are free to determine how best
to meet their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. India contended that its
"administrative instructions" were sufficient, but the panel found that the current
administrative practice in India created a certain degree of legal insecurity. The
appellate body thus upheld the panel's conclusion that India had not complied with
TRIPS. See id. paras. 23-36.
169 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, paras. 8, 15.
171 See WTO Panel Report on U.S.-Impon Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter PR Shrimp]. The U.S. issued
regulations, 52 Fed. Reg. 24244 (June 29, 1987), pursuant to the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et. seq. (1996), requiring all U.S. shrimp trawl vessels to use
turtle excluder devices or tow-time restrictions in specific areas where there was a
significant mortality of sea turtles in shrimp harvesting. Section 609 of the ESA, 16
U.S.C. §1537 (1996) was enacted in 1989 and imposed an import ban on shrimp
harvested with commercial fishing technology which may adversely affect sea turtles,
unless the harvesting nations are certified. Guidelines specified the two types of
certification, and 1996 guidelines provide that all shrimp imported into the U.S. must be
accompanied by a Shrimp Exporter's Declaration attesting that the shrimp were
harvested in waters of a certified nation or under conditions that don't adversely affect
sea turtles. 56 Fed. Reg. 1051 (Jan. 10, 1991); 58 Fed. Reg. 9015 (Feb. 18, 1993); 61
Fed. Reg. 17342 (April 19, 1996). In 1995, the U.S. Court of International Trade held
that the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines violated Section 609 by limiting the geographical
scope to shrimp harvested in the Caribbean/western Atlantic region, and directed the
Department of State to extend the law worldwide by May, 1996. See Earth Island
Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995). In 1996, the court
refused a request by the State Department to extend the deadline. See Earth Island
Institute v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). In 1998, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated this decision. See Earth Island Institute
v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352, 1354 (1998).
1"I See PR Shrimp, supra note 170, paras. 8.1, 8.2. The ban is inconsistent with
Article VI: I and Article XX of GATT 1994. See id.
172 See WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S.-Import Prohibition of Certain
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United States and reversed the panel on the issue of accepting
submissions from non-state parties.'73  The appellate body
nevertheless concluded that the U.S. measure failed to meet the
requirements of GATT 1994.114 The U.S. ban, as applied, imposed
a single, rigid, and unbending requirement without inquiring into
the appropriateness of the condition in the exporting country, thus
constituting arbitrary discrimination in violation of GATT 1994;
the effect was plainly discriminatory and unjustifiable.' In
addition to opening the door to non-governmental submissions, the
appellate body also stated what they did not decide in the appeal.
We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the
environment is of no significance to the Members of the WTO.
Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations
that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures
to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they
can and should. And we have not decided that sovereign states
should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or
multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international
fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the
environment. Clearly, they should and do.'
The DSB approved both reports and the parties agreed to an
implementation period, which expires on December 6, 1999.'
In a dispute between the United States and Costa Rica over
trade in cotton and man-made underwear, the United States
requested consultation and provided Costa Rica with a Statement
of Serious Damage, in which the United States proposed to
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R paras. 9, 98 (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
ABR Shrimp]. The U.S. also raised the issue of whether the panel erred in its conclusion
concerning Art. XX of GATT 1994. See generally, Daniel Esty, Linkages and
Governance: NGOD at the WTO, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L 709 (1998).
'13 See ABR Shrimp, supra note 172, para. 187(a). While the dispute settlement
process is limited to WTO members, and a panel is obliged to accept and consider only
submissions by WTO members as parties and third party participants, panels may seek
information and advice that the panels deem appropriate. See id. para. 101, According
to the appellate body, authority to seek information is not properly equated with a
prohibition on information submitted but not requested by a panel. See id. para. 108.
174 See id. para. 187(c). The measure is not justified under Article XX of GATT
1994. See id.
1 See id. paras. 172, 177.
176 Id. para. 185 (emphasis added).
177 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 16..
19991
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
introduce restraints on imports of underwear from Costa Rica.'78
When consultations did not result in a mutually acceptable
solution, the United States introduced a safeguard measure, but a
Textile Monitoring Board found that the United States failed to
demonstrate serious damage to the U.S. domestic industry.'79
Costa Rica requested a panel and the panel concluded that the
United States violated the Agreement in Textiles and Clothing 8°
by imposing a restriction on Costa Rican exports without having
demonstrated serious damage to the U.S. domestic industry.
1 81
Costa Rica appealed certain issues of law relating to the starting
date of the restraint period; the appellate body agreed with Costa
Rica in February 1997 and left intact the issues not raised on
appeal.'82 The DSB adopted both reports and the United States
complied.'83
In February 1997, another appellate body report was issued in
a dispute brought by the Philippines against Brazil over
countervailing duties imposed by Brazil on imports of desiccated
coconut from the Philippines. 84 The appellate body upheld the
legal findings of the panel, which held that the Philippines' claims
were not properly before the panel because those claims were
under GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture, which were
not applicable law for the dispute. 185  The DSB adopted both
reports. 186
178 WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S--Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and
Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter ABR
Cotton].
17' See id. § I.
18' Establishment of an Import Limit for Certain Cotton and Man-Made Fibre
Textile Products Produced or Manufactured in Costa Rica, 60 Federal Register 32653
(1995).
181 See ABR Cotton, supra note 178, § VII.
182 See id. § VII.
183 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § VIII, para. 3.
184 WTO Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated
Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb. 21, 1997).
185 See id. paras. 280, 294, 295. Article VI of GATT 1994 was at issue. The
measures were written consistent or inconsistent with Article VI, rather they were not
subject to Art. VI. See id. para. 280.
186 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § VIII, para. 4. There was no
implementation issue in view of the result. See id.
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In April 1997, an appellate body upheld a panel report in a
case brought by India against the United States challenging U.S.
measures that affected imports of woven wool shirts and blouses
from India.'87 The United States imposed a transitional safeguard
on imports of woven wool shirts and blouses from India, under the
agreement on Textiles and Clothing, "after bilateral consultation
... did not result in a mutually agreed solution." '88 India requested
a panel and the interim panel report was released. After the report
was released, the United States announced the withdrawal of the
safeguard due to the steady decline in imports of such items.18 9
Nonetheless, India requested that the panel continue. The panel
concluded that the "U.S. measure nullified and impaired the
benefits of India under the WTO Agreement, in particularly under
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing."'1 90 India appealed
alleged errors in law concerning the burden of proof and other
issues, but the appellate body upheld the legal findings and
conclusions of the panel. 9' The DSB approved both reports, but
because the measure was withdrawn there were no implementation
issues. 92
In a 1996 case the United States complained that Canada
prohibited or restricted the importation of certain periodicals into
Canada and gave favorable postal rates to certain Canadian
periodicals in violation of GATT.' 93 The panel found that certain
Canadian measures were inconsistent with GATT.194 In June 1997,
187 WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S.-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R § VII (Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter
ABR Shirts].
188 Id. § 1, para. 5. The Textiles Monitoring Body concluded, and confirmed on
review, that the safeguard "was imposed in accordance with the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing." Id.
189 See id.
"9 WTO Panel Report on U.S.-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts
and Blouses from India, WT/DS33 para. 8.1 (Jan. 6, 1997).
' See ABR Shirts, supra note 187, § VII.
192 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 5.
193 WTO Panel Report on Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS31 para. 6 (Mar. 14, 1997).
194 See id. paras. 6.1, 6.2. The panel concluded that Canada's Tariff Code 9958,
which prohibits the importation into Canada of certain periodicals, including split-run
editions, "is inconsistent with Article XI:I of GATT 1994 and cannot be justified under
Article XX (d) of GATT 1994." Id. para. 6. Also, part "V.1 of the Excise Tax Act is
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an appellate body recommended that the findings and conclusions
of the panel that were not subject to the appeal be left intact. The
appellate body also upheld one finding, reversed two findings, and
modified a third finding. 95 The DSB accepted the appellate body
reports and the panel report as modified; Canada withdrew the
contested measure. 196
A panel was established to review a U.S. complaint against
Argentina regarding Argentine imposition of specific duties on
various textile, apparel, and footwear import items. The United
States alleged that Argentina charged duties in excess of the bound
rate of 35% ad valorem, and imposed statistical 3% taxes ad
valorem on all imports from non-MERCOSUR countries.1 97 The
panel concluded that "the minimum specific duties imposed by
Argentina on textiles and apparel" and the 3% ad valorem tax on
imports "were inconsistent with GATT."'98  The appellate body
modified, but upheld, the panel report in March 1998.99 The
inconsistent with Article 111:2, first sentence of GATT 1994." Id. Further, "the
application by the Canada Post of lower 'commercial Canadian' postal rates to
domestically-produced periodicals than to imported periodicals [including additional
discount options available only to domestic periodicals] is inconsistent with Article III:4
of GATT 1994." Id. The panel concluded that Canada's funded postal scheme is
consistent with GATT 1994. See id.
'9' WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada-Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997). The appellate body upheld the panel
recommendation on the applicability of GATT to the excise tax, but reversed the panel's
conclusions on Article 111:2, first sentence of GATT 1994. See id. para 6. The appellate
body modified the panel recommendation on Article 2, second sentence of GAT'T 1994,
and reversed its decision on the funded postal rate scheme, concluding that it is not
justified by GATT 1994. See generally Richard L. Matheny III, In the Wake of the
Flood: "Like Products" and Cultural Products after the WTO's Decision in Canada
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1998).
196 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § VIII, para. 14.
197 See WTO Panel Report on Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56 para. 1.1 (Nov. 25, 1997).
198 Id. para. 7.1. The minimum duties are inconsistent with Article II of GATT and
the 3% ad valorem tax is inconsistent with Article VIII of GATT. See id.
'99 See WTO Appellate Body Report on Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R para. 87 (Mar. 27, 1998).
The panel was upheld, but the finding on GATT Article II was modified. Argentina
acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 11(b), first sentence, of GATT
1994, because import customs duties were levied in excess of the bound rate of 35% ad
valorem. See id.
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modified reports were adopted by the DSB.2 00 Argentina and the
United States agreed that Argentina would cap specific duties on
textiles and apparel at 35% by October 1998, and would reduce its
statistical tax to 0.5% by January 1, 1999. In May 1999,
Argentina notified the DSB that no import transactions covered by
the statistical tax would be taxed above the amounts agreed to by
Argentina and the United States.2 '
A panel considered U.S. complaints against the European
Community, Iceland, and the United Kingdom concerning tariff
treatment of local area network (LAN) equipment and personal
computers with multimedia capabilities. 202 The panel concluded
that the European Community was in violation of GATT 1994,
"by failing to accord imports of LAN equipment from the U.S.
treatment no less favorable than provided under the GATT
schedule."03 In June 1998, the appellate body reversed the panel's
finding.2 4 The DSB adopted the appellate body report and the
modified panel report; there was no implementation issue in light
of the result.
A panel convened to consider Brazil's complaint concerning
the European Community's regime for the importation of certain
frozen poultry products and its implementation of tariff-rate quotas
on such products 6.20  The panel found that Brazil did not establish
that the European Community had failed to administer the tariff
200 See Disputes Website, supra note 49, § VIII, para. 14.
201 See id.
202 WTO Panel Report on E.C.-Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment, WT/DS62, WT/DS67, WT/DS68 (Feb. 5, 1998).
203 See id. para. 9.1. The European Community gave LAN equipment no less
favorable treatment than required under heading 87.71 or 87.73 in Part I of Schedule
LXXX. See WTO Agreement, at 1125.
204 WTO Appellate Body Report on E.C.-Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R para. 111
(June 5, 1998). The United States did not have "'legitimate expectations' that LAN
equipment would be accorded the same tariff treatment as ADP machines in the
European Community" and thus the European Community did not act inconsistently
with the provisions of Article 11:1 of GATT 1994 by failing to accorded the LAN
imports no less favorable treatment than that provided for in schedule LXXX. Id.
205 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § VIII, para. 12.
206 WTO Panel Report on E.C.-Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain
Poultry Products, WT/DS69 (Mar. 12, 1998) [hereinafter PR Poultry].
1999]
100 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 25
rate quota in accordance with the WTO Agreement.27  In July
1998, the appellate body upheld most of the panel's report.0 8 The
DSB adopted the modified reports and the parties agreed on a
reasonable implementation period ending in March 1999.20
Another panel reviewed Venezuelan and Brazilian allegations
that the United States discriminated against complainants'
gasoline imports. 2'0  The panel found that a U.S. regulation
violated GATT."' The appellate body modified the panel report
then adopted it.2"2 The DSB adopted the modified reports and the
U.S. announced implementation in August 1997.23
Mexico's complaint against Guatemala over that country's
anti-dumping investigation regarding Portland cement from
Mexico was not considered in the Statistical Overview, because
the appellate body concluded, in November 1998, that the dispute
207 See id. paras. 274-98. The European Community, Brazil, and nine other
countries negotiated quotas and licensing requirements for relevant poultry products.
European Community Schedule LXXX provides for a duty-free tariff rate quota for
certain tons of frozen poultry. See WTO Agreement, at 1125. The panel held that Brazil
did not demonstrate that the European Community failed to implement and administer
the tariff rate quota in accordance with the obligations under the WTO agreement,
Article XIII of GATT, the licensing agreement, and Article 5.1 (b) of the Agreement on
Agriculture. See PR Poultry, supra note 206, paras. 274-98.
208 WTO Appellate Body Report on E.C.-Measures Affecting the Importation of
Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R para. 172 (July 13, 1998). Most of the panel
report was upheld. The appellate body reversed the panel decision on the European
Community's violation of Article 5. 1(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture, but concluded
that the European Community acted inconsistently with Article 5.5 of the Agreement on
Agriculture. See id.
209 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 13.
210 WTO Panel Report on U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2, WT/DS7 (Jan. 29, 1996).
211 See id. para. 8.1. The U.S. regulation discriminated against complainants'
gasoline in violation of GATT Article III, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Article 2. See id.
212 WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2, WT/DS4 (Apr. 22, 1996). GATT Art. XX(g), the
exception, was not applicable. See generally Hans J. Crosby, The WTO Appellate Body-
U.S. v. Venezuela: Interpreting the Preamble of Art. XX-Are Possibilities for
Environmental Protection Under Art. XX(g) of GA T Disappearing? 9 VILL. ENVT'L L.
J. 283, (1998); Telisa Webb Schelin, U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline: The Effect of the WTO Decision on the U.S. and its Administrative Agencies,
33 TULSA L.J. 421 (1997).
213 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 1.
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was not properly before the panel.214 Therefore, the appellate body
came "to no conclusions as to whether the panel was right or
wrong in finding that Guatemala had acted inconsistently with its
obligations under the ... Anti-Dumping Agreement.,215 The DSB
adopted the appellate body report and the panel report as reversed
by the appellate body.1 6
D. Complaints Resulting in Panel Reports
At the time of this writing, nine complaints have resulted in
panel reports, and one complaint has resulted in a panel report and
an arbitrator's report.217  The complaint that resulted in a panel
report and an arbitrator's report was brought by the United States,
Japan, and the European Community against Indonesia I.2 " The
complainants prevailed in their claims that Indonesia's National
Car Programme violated Indonesia's obligations under GATT
1994.219 The arbitrator gave Indonesia twelve months toS • 220
implement the panel recommendations.
Of the nine complaints resulting in panel reports thus far,
77.7% of the complainants have won their cases.' Of the nine
cases in this section, three were brought by developed countries
against developed countries.2  Developed countries brought three
cases against developing countries.2  One case pitted a
214 WTO Appellate Body Report on Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R para. 89 (DS60 Nov. 2,
1998).
215 Id.
216 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 18. A request for consultation
was made in January, 1999. See id.
217 See WTO Panel Report on Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, WT/DS54, WT[DS55, WT/DS59 (July 2, 1998).
218 See id. The three complainants are developed countries, while Indonesia is a
developing country.
219 See id. para. 15.1. The panel found that Indonesia was in violation of Articles I
and 111:2 of GATT 1999, Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Article 5(c), but not
Article 28.2, of the SCM Agreement. Indonesia had not violated TRIPS. See id.
220 WTO Arbitrators Report on Indonesia--Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/ARB, WT/DS55/ARB, WT/DS59/ARB (Dec. 7, 1998).
221 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, para. VIII, summary.
222 See id.
223 See id.
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developing country against another developing country. Finally,
developing countries brought two cases against developed
224
countries.
The developing countries won their cases against developed
countries in each of the two cases,225 and developed countries also
won all of their cases against developing countries. 22' Korea
prevailed in a complaint that it brought against the United States
over DRAMs.227 India prevailed in complaints that it brought
against Turkey over textiles. 28 Australia suppressed a U.S. claim
over leather subsidies.2 29  The United States and New Zealand
prevailed in a complaint brought against Canada over milk and
dairy products."3  A panel sided with Canada in a complaint
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 WTO Panel Report on U.S.-Anti-Dumping Duty on DRAMS of One Megabyte
or Above from Korea, WT/DS99 para. 4.95 (Jan. 29, 1999). Korea filed a complaint
against the United States after the U.S. Department of Commerce decided not to revoke
an anti-dumping duty on dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semi-conductor
chips of one megabyte or above from Korea. Korea alleged that DRAM producers
haven't dumped for over three and one half years, and won't dump in the future. A
panel found that the U.S. measures violated the anti-dumping agreement. See id. The
panel's report was adopted in March, 1999, and in April of 1999, the United States stated
that it was studying ways to implement the panel's report. See Disputes Website, supra
note 48, § I, para. 21.
228 WTO Panel Report on India-Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing
Products, WT/DS29 para. 10.1 (May 31, 1999). India requested a panel having claimed
that that Turkey's imposition of quantitative restrictions on imports on a broad range of
textile and clothing products was inconsistent with GATT" 1994 Articles XI and XIII.
The panel found that Turkey's measures were inconsistent with GATT and Article 2.4 of
the Agreement or Textile and Clothing. See id. paras. 1.3, 10.1.
229 WTO Panel Report on Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and
Exporters of Automotive Leather, WT/DS126 para. 10 (May 25, 1999). The U.S. lodged
a complaint over prohibited subsidies allegedly provided to Australian producers and
exporters of automotive leather. See id. para 1.3. The subsidies alleged consist of
preferential governmental loans of A$25 million and non-commercial grants of A$30
million. See paras. 2.3, 2.4. A panel found the loan made by the Australian
government is not a subsidy, but the grants were. See id. para. 10.1.
230 WTO Panel Report on Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products, WT/DS103, WT/DS 113 para. 8.1 (May 17, 1999).
The U.S. and New Zealand complained about Canada's export subsidies commonly
called the "special milk classes" scheme, and the U.S. complained about Canada's
administration of the tariff-rate quota on milk. One panel was formed, which found that
these measures were inconsistent with Canada's obligations under Article 11.1(b) of
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brought against Brazil over export subsidies on aircraft,231 and
Brazil's complaint against Canada over export aircraft resulted in
a panel report in favor of Brazil.232 The United States prevailed in
a complaint against India over import restrictions,233 and the
European Community prevailed against India in a dispute over the
enforcement of patents.234 The United States brought an
unsuccessful claim against Japan regarding film. 35
GATT 1994, and Articles 9.1(a) and (c) of the Agreement on agriculture. See id. paras.
1.5, 1.6.
231 WTO Panel Report on Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS96 (Apr. 14, 1999). Canada requested consultations with Brazil, claiming that
Brazilian export subsidies to foreign purchasers of Brazil's Embraer aircraft violate both
the Subsidies Agreement and GATT 1994. See id. para. 1.2. Canada requested a panel;
Brazil objected. See id. para. 1.1. Canada then modified its request, limiting its request
to the Subsidies Agreement. See id. para. 1.4. The panel found the Brazilian measures
to be inconsistent with Art 3.1 (a) and 27.4 of the Subsidies Agreement. See id. para. 8.1.
The panel's overall conclusions were upheld on appeal. See WTO Appellate Body
Report on Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT[DS96/AB/R para. 196
(Aug. 2, 1999).
232 WTO Panel Report on Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70 (DS70 April 17, 1999). Brazil requested a panel over allegations
that Canada supports the export of civilian aircraft in violation of the Subsidies
Agreement. A panel agreed, and in May, 1999 Canada appealed. Appellate body upheld
decision on appeal. See WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada-Measures Affecting
the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R para. 220 (Apr. 17, 1999).
233 WTO Panel Report on India--Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTIDS90 (Apr. 6, 1999). The U.S.
requested a panel to investigate whether India violated GATT 1994, the Agreement on
Agriculture, and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures by quantitative
restrictions on the imports of over 2,700 agricultural and industrial products. The panel
found that the measures were inconsistent with India's obligations under Arts, XI and
XIII of GATT 1994 and Art. 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The decision was
upheld on appeal. See WTO Appellate Body Report on India--Quantitative Restrictions
on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90 (Aug. 23, 1999).
234 See Disputes Website, supra note 48, § I, para. 15.
235 WTO Panel Report on Japan--Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper, WT/DS44 paras. 10.402-10.403 (Mar. 31, 1998). The United States
requested consultation with Japan over Japan's laws affecting imported consumer
photographic film and paper. The United States alleged that Articles III and X of GAIT
were violated because Japan treated imported film and paper less favorably. The panel,
however, concluded that the United States did not demonstrate that the Japanese
measures nullified or impaired either individually or collectively, "benefits accruing to
the U.S. within the meaning of GATT Article XXIII: I(b)." Id. para. 10.402. Further, the
United States did not demonstrate "that Japan failed to publish administrative rulings of
general application in violation of GATT Article X:1." Id. para. 10.404.
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IV. Conclusion
One of the greatest strengths of the WTO is its dispute
resolution mechanism. Since its inception there have been 175
236
requests for consultations involving 134 distinct matters.
Developed countries made 77% of these requests for
consultations."' The author expected this result upon undertaking
her research. The author also expected, however, that developed
countries, and particularly the United States, would have generally
prevailed in the dispute resolution process. This was not the case.
Of the twenty-six cases analyzed, developing countries prevailed
100% of the time against developed countries, and 89% of the
time in all cases they brought. 238 Complainants prevailed in
twenty-one out of twenty-six cases, or 80.8% of the time. 39 Of the
four times a complainant lost, three times that complainant was the
United States, and the United States lost eight of the nineteen
cases in which it was a party.24
Since complainants win the vast majority of the cases in which
they are involved, it is expected that complainants will continue to
bring disputes to the WTO. One weakness of the dispute process,
however, is the relative unenforceability of the WTO's decisions.
This can escalate into trade wars among the parties. The
reluctance of many countries to give up some degree of national
• • 241
sovereignty, the fact that Russia and China are not WTO
members,242 and the lobbying and pressure that corporations and
236 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
241 See generally William R. Sprance, The WTO and U.S. Sovereignty, 13 AM. U.
INT'LL. REV. 1225 (1998).
242 See Christian L. Broadbent and Amanda M. McMillian, Russia and the WTO:
Will TRIPS be a Stumbling Block to Accession? 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519
(1998); William J. Kovatch, Jr., Joining the Club: Assessing Russia's Application for
Accession to the WTO, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 995 (1998); Julia Cheng, China's Copyright
System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an Internal Focus and WTO
Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1941 (1998); David Blumenthal, "Reform" or
"Opening"? Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprises and WTO Accession-The
Dilemma of Applying GATT to Marketizing Economies, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 198
(1998).
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individuals placed on governments to bring complaints to the
WTO,243 are all additional impediments to the effective resolution
of disputes under the WTO. Despite these weaknesses and
impediments, the WTO's dispute resolution process will continue
to develop, and the WTO will certainly hear many more
complaints in the future.
243 See generally Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties
to Raise Claims before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275
(1997).
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